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Summary
The proposed acquisition of six major U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World and Unocal
by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has sparked intense concerns
among some Members of Congress and the public and has reignited the debate over
what role foreign acquisitions play in U.S. national security.  While the United States
actively promotes internationally the policy of relaxing rules concerning foreign
investment, including the national treatment of foreign firms, some in Congress and
others question some aspects of this policy as it relates to allowing foreign competitors
unlimited access to the Nation’s industrial base.  Much of this debate focuses  on the
activities of a relatively obscure committee, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) and the Exon-Florio provision, which gives the President broad
powers to block certain types of foreign investment.  This report will be updated as
warranted by events.
Background
According to the Department of Commerce,1 foreigners invested $113 billion in U.S.
businesses and real estate in 2004, which represents nearly a tripling in the amount
invested in 2003.  This amount, however, is about half as much as U.S. firms invested
abroad and far below the record $300 billion foreigners invested in 2000.   The lower
level of foreign direct investment flows, although particularly sharp for the United States,
is not unique.  According to the United Nation’s World Investment Report, global foreign
direct investment flows dropped by 41% in 2001 and 21% in 2002 due to slow economic
growth in most of the parts of the world, falling stock market valuations, lower corporate
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profitability, a slowdown in corporate restructuring, and a slowdown in privatization
efforts in some areas.2
The cumulative amount, or stock, of foreign direct investment in the United States
on a historical cost basis3 increased by $38 billion in 2003 to nearly $1.4 trillion.  This
marked an increase of less than three percent over the previous year and an improvement
over the decrease in the position in the previous year when some affiliates repaid
substantial loans to their foreign parent companies and the foreign parent companies
wrote down the value of acquisitions they had made prior to the slowdown in the U.S.
economy.4  
With over $230 billion invested in the United States, Great Britain is the largest
foreign direct investor.  Japan has moved into the position as the second largest foreign
direct investor in the U.S. economy with over $159 billion in investments.  Following the
Japanese are the Germans ($149 billion) and Dutch ($146 billion), with the French close
behind ($143 billion).   Recently, China has attracted particular attention as a result of a
number of proposed acquisitions.  Worldwide, Chinese acquisition transactions jumped
from $2-$3 billion in previous years to $23 billion so far in 2005.5  
The Exon-Florio Provision
In 1988, amid concerns over foreign acquisition of certain types of U.S. firms,
particularly by Japanese firms, Congress approved the Exon-Florio provision of the
Defense Production Act.6  This statute grants the President the authority to block proposed
or pending foreign acquisitions of “persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States” that threaten to impair the national security.  In subsequent legislation, Congress
directed that this process be applied “in any instance in which an entity controlled by or
acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any merger, acquisition, or
takeover which could result in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States that could affect the national security of the United States.”  Many in
Congress were concerned at the time that foreign takeovers of U.S. firms could not be
stopped unless the President declared a national emergency or regulators invoked federal
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antitrust, environmental, or securities laws.  The Exon-Florio provision grants the
President the authority to take what action he considers to be “appropriate” to suspend or
prohibit proposed or pending foreign acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers of persons
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States which threaten to impair the national
security.  Congress directed, however, that before this authority can be invoked the
President is expected to believe that other U.S. laws are inadequate or inappropriate to
protect the national security, and that he must have “credible evidence” that the foreign
investment will impair the national security.  For the purposes of this legislation,
Congress purposely did not define national security, but intended to have the term
interpreted broadly without limitation to a particular industry.7
The authority to administer the Exon-Florio provision was delegated to the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),8 which is housed in the
Department of the Treasury.  The Committee had been established under a previous
Executive Order with broad responsibilities, but few powers.9  It was originally
established with eight members, but has been expanded to twelve over time.  The twelve
members include the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, and
Commerce; the United States Trade Representative; the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers; the Attorney General; the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget; the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs; and the Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy.10  The Committee has 30 days to decide whether to investigate a case and an
additional 45 days to make its recommendation.  Once the recommendation is made, the
President has 15 days to act.
In 1992, Congress amended the statute through section 837(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.  Known as the “Byrd” amendment after
the amendment’s sponsor, the provision requires CFIUS to investigate proposed mergers,
acquisitions, or takeovers in cases where:
(1) the acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government; and
(2) the acquisition results in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in
the United States that could affect the national security of the United States.11
Through the Exon-Florio provision, Congress directed that CFIUS, and therefore the
President, should consider a short list of factors in deciding to block a foreign acquisition,
merger, or takeover.  This list includes the following elements:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements;
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(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology,
materials, and other supplies and services;
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as
it affects the capability and capacity of the U.S. to meet the requirements of national
security;
(4) the potential effects of the transactions on the sales of military goods, equipment,
or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates missile technology or
chemical and biological weapons; and
(5) the potential effects of the transaction on U.S. technological leadership in areas
affecting U.S. national security.
In November 1991, the Treasury Department issued final regulations, after extensive
public comment, implementing the Exon-Florio provision.12  These regulations created
an essentially voluntary system of notification by the parties to an acquisition, but they
also allow for notice by agencies that are members of CFIUS.  Despite the voluntary
nature of the notification, firms largely notify voluntarily because the regulations stipulate
that foreign acquisitions that are governed by the Exon-Florio review process that do not
notify the Committee remain subject indefinitely to divestment or other appropriate
actions by the President.  Under most circumstances, notice of a proposed acquisition that
is given to the Committee by a third party, including shareholders, is not considered by
the Committee to constitute an official notification.  The regulations also indicate that
notifications provided to the Committee are considered to be confidential and the
information is not released by the Committee to the press or commented on publicly.
Caseload
As a consequence of the confidential nature of the CFIUS review of any proposed
transaction, there are few public sources of information concerning the Committee’s work
to date.  For the most part, information concerning individual transactions that have been
reviewed by CFIUS or any final recommendations that have been issued by CFIUS have
come from announcements made by the companies involved in a transaction and not by
CFIUS.  Therefore public information concerning the outcome of CFIUS’s reviews are
incomplete.  According to one source,13 CFIUS has received more than 1,500
notifications, of which it conducted a full investigation of 25 cases.  Of these 25 cases,
thirteen transactions were withdrawn upon notice that CFIUS would conduct a full review
and twelve of the remaining transactions cases were sent to the President.  Of these twelve
transactions, one was prohibited. 
The transaction that was prohibited by the President involved the  acquisition in 1990
of Mamco Manufacturing Company by the China National Aero-Technology Import and
Export Corporation (CATIC).  Mamco was an aerospace parts manufacturer.  CATIC,
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which is owned by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, acted as the
purchasing agent for the Chinese Ministry of Defense.  President Reagan ordered CATIC
to divest itself of Mamco under the authority of the Exon-Florio provision because of
concerns that CATIC might gain access to technology through Mamco that it would
otherwise have to obtain under an export license.14  One recent case that involved a
Chinese firm that was reviewed by CFIUS and approved was the proposed acquisition of
IBM’s Personal Computing Division to Lenovo Group Limited, a Chinese manufacturing
company.
Most often, CFIUS has approved proposed transactions if the parties involved agreed
to certain conditions.  For instance, in 2000, the Committee allowed Nippon Telephone
& Telegraph Company to acquire Verio, Inc, an Internet service provider, by obtaining
a strict ban on involvement by the Japanese government in the firm.  Similar concerns
arose with the proposed acquisition in 2003 of Global Crossing, Ltd.  by Hutchinson
Whampoa Ltd. of Hong Kong and Technologies Telemedia of Singapore.  U.S. officials
reportedly were concerned that foreign ownership of Global Crossing’s fiber-optics
network might make the U.S. government vulnerable to eavesdropping from overseas and
some Members of Congress were concerned about Hutchinson’s ties to the Chinese
military.  To ease these concerns, Hutchinson offered to play a passive role in the
company.  Nevertheless, CFIUS decided to conduct a full 45-day review of the
transaction, at which point the Chinese firm backed out of the deal.  Eventually, CFIUS
approved the acquisition by the Singapore firm by itself, because it offered to put
Americans on the board of Global Crossing.15
Concerns With Foreign Investment
A key issue for Congress is whether and in what way it should respond to essentially
private economic investment activities and how to assess the impact of such investments
on the Nation’s security.  At the time the Exon-Florio provision was debated and
approved, Congress did not intend to inhibit foreign direct investment in industries which
are not of national security interest.  Although the Exon-Florio provision widened the
scope of transactions that CFIUS reviewed for potential national security concerns, the
practical application of the provision has focused more often on the implications for U.S.
national defense security.  The United States already prohibits foreign direct investment
in such industries as maritime, aircraft, banking, resources, and power.16  Generally, these
sectors were closed to foreign investors to prevent public services and public interest
activities from falling under foreign control, but again primarily for national defense
purposes.
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The debate over foreign investment in the United States continues to be marked by
differing assessments of the economic implications of foreign investment, a lack of a clear
consensus on what role foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms play in U.S. national security,
and philosophical and political divisions over the proper policy course to follow.  Some
critics have argued that the CFIUS process is too uncertain and too narrowly focused to
adequately protect the Nation’s long-term economic interests.  For instance, some argue
that the Committee does not consider the potential effects a foreign acquisition could have
on the American workforce as a national security concern, even if the aim of the foreign
suitor is to obtain technical information and processes, which it intends to use to shift
production processes and plants abroad.
Others argue that the relative change in the economic position of the United States
warrants a reassessment of some of the assumptions that underlie U.S. international
economic policies, including allowing foreign competitors unlimited access to the most
important components of the U.S. industrial base.  At the heart of such concerns over
foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms lies the lack of a national consensus over how national
security should be defined as it relates to private investments in U.S. firms and how to
weigh the economic impact of foreign investment in U.S. firms.
